Abstract
Introduction
Software reuse can be viewed as a means for achieving rapid system development, saving resources and time, and for keeping up technologically in an increasingly advancing global software-development environment. Reuse offers many benefits and yet much of the software developed today is still newly developed but not unique. Part of the problem in making software reuse more prevalent is that software is often not designed with reuse in mind and that not enough readily available information is shared by the developer with other potential users of the software. Within safety-critical systems and system-of-systems, the challenge of reusing software is even greater than that of so-called stove-piped systems. At present there is very little formal guidance or standards in existence that maximize the utility of software reuse within an industry, safetycritical systems, system-of-systems, or the penultimatesafety-critical system-of-systems, which is the focus of the research reported in this paper.
Both planning for reuse and determining the appropriateness of reuse in safety-critical system-ofsystems represents a significant challenge because of the large number of potential system configurations and their non-stationarity along with the associated emergent hazards and derived safety requirements. There is uncertainty and risk associated with assumptions and unknowns regarding the interfaces between the component systems and issues of system interoperability. There are also many rules and restrictions that must be applied to the reuse of software in a safety-critical system. Furthermore, safety is a system property and thus reused software will impact on the system safety. In order to overcome these challenges, system software needs to be designed for both reuse and safety. The relevant information for safety must be shared effectively, and a safety analysis must be performed to confirm an environmental match. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) released an advisory circular in 2004 on reusable software components (AC20-148) [1] describing an approach and the documentation necessary for systematic reuse of software components that meet the guidelines of DO-178B, Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification. AC20-148 now allows for acceptance of software independent of a hardware platform, enabling developers to take certification credit on one project and apply it to future projects. The advisory circular presents an approach for encouraging and reaping the benefits of software reuse. We leveraged other efforts to make software reuse more prevalent such as the 2004 FAA guidance on reusable software components and the US Navy's open architecture strategy and developed a process-neutral framework for software reuse in safetycritical system-of-systems; the FAA guidance is thorough on software reuse but focuses on collaboration, communication and product deliverables instead of a systematic approach across the software life cycle.
The framework consists of four elements: (i) organizational factors, (ii) component attributes, (iii) component specification, and (iv) safety analysis. These elements will be described in this paper. We demonstrate the application of the framework with an example involving the reuse of a generic avionics software component.
The Framework
According to Lim [2] software reuse is most effective when practiced systematically. In order to achieve a systematic approach which is also holistic and multidisciplinary, a framework for software reuse in safety-critical system-ofsystems is required for identifying the key aspects, factors and influencers on software reuse and for generating early consideration of them. To support the successful application of software reuse in a systematic approach, we propose a framework that consists of an enabler and three pillars: The particular context of safety-critical system-of-systems places greater emphasis on reusable software component attributes (2) as well as the impact it has on the safety analysis (4) . What differentiates this framework from a framework for reuse in general is the level of detail in each element and that safety analysis is an essential part of the proposed framework. Figure 1 illustrates how the elements contribute to achieving effective software reuse in safety-critical systemof-systems. In this case the framework highlights the supporting structure for software reuse. The framework is process-neutral and represents the desired elements for successful software reuse.
Organizational Factors
Organizational factors represent the enabling and supporting functions within an organization which must exist to achieve successful software reuse in any context. These are non-technical, management factors that have significant influence on any software reuse activity and if not aligned appropriately can dramatically affect the success of any proposed software reuse. Effective software reuse requires a strong commitment from senior management, a documented process that supports the organization's mission, a software reuse policy, and a designated software reuse team. The significant factors affecting software reuse from an organizational perspective can be decomposed into the categories of culture, people, structure, reuse domain, reuse potential, reuse capability, policies and processes, and reuse metrics.
Software Component Attributes
A software component is a collection of software comprising a module with a well-defined purpose that may be used with no or minimal alteration. Ideally a software component represents a reusable piece of software that can be easily integrated with other components with relatively little effort. The key is to achieve that ideal level.
The software component attributes described in this section represent the ideals or goals as it may not be possible to achieve all in the one component. The following component attributes may not be achievable to the desired level required, and the exact levels will depend on the results of trade studies. Reusable software components for use in safety-critical system-of-systems should have the following attributes:
• They should be transparent to the user including the essential documentation requirements of that component.
•
The component should do one thing and do it well and have minimal interactions with other components (i.e., have both high cohesion and low coupling).
The software component shall consist of well-formed modules, be protected, include the localization of data, and comply with Meyer's criteria and principles for modularity [3] . Meyer's criteria for modularity (decomposability, composability, understandability, continuity and protection) and his five principles (direct mapping, few interfaces, small interfaces, explicit interfaces, and information hiding) should be followed in the design of reusable software components.
• A reusable software component should follow the "open-closed" principle in that it will be usable as it stands (closed) while still being adaptable (open).
The software components should be generic to allow for type variation and thus creating a wider range of reuse. The component should be independent of implementation.
The software component should include routine grouping in order to be self sufficient and cover all possible actions required for a particular purpose (i.e., include the complete set of routines required to achieve its intended purpose).
The software component should cover a wide variety of implementations through a module family where it is not possible for a single module to satisfy all requirements, thus requiring a module or component family.
The software component should be independent of representation. That is, the component should be able to carry out an operation without knowing implementation details and variants.
The software component should factor out common behaviors. Instead of having a component for every type of implementation such as in a family of components, common behaviors can be factored out and modularized into a component thereby both reducing the number of components or modules in a family and making the reuse selection easier.
The component shall be robust in its environment, in that it should be able to react appropriately to a wide range of abnormal conditions expected when operating in a system and system-of-systems context.
•
The software component should be free of default behavior that has not been specifically described by the software engineer for that component.
• The component should be sufficiently evaluated and tested to verify the implementation of the safety attributes and requirements.
The software components must be designed with safety in mind, consisting of safety features and protection mechanisms and should use formal semantics for specifying safety attributes and safety contracts where feasible.
The component should comply with the critical success factors for reuse quality of the component.
Software Component Specification
There are many ways to specify a software component and completely describe it to provide the desired level of understandability. That level of understandability for a system-of-systems safety-critical component is relatively high. Early work on specifying software components includes the 3C model by Weide et al. [4] and Tracz [5] :
Concept.
A statement of what a piece of software does, factoring out how it does it (abstract specification of abstract behavior).
• Content. A statement of how a piece of software achieves the behavior defined in its concept (the code to implement a functional specification).
• Context. Aspects of the software environment relevant to the definition of concept or content that are explicitly part of the concept or content.
The 3C model is highly abstract, making it difficult for a user to find the component sought. Another model proposed by Riehle [6] focuses on describing the software component and increasing the transparency of the information about a particular software component. The CRCCC or CRC 3 specification as described by Riehle at the component level is:
• Component Identifier. Self-describing name Extending the specification models described above, we propose a new specification model, called C 5 RA, to provide the necessary information for specification matching in safety-critical system-of-systems. C 5 RA consists of:
• Component Identifier. This is the name of the component which should be semantically accurate and conform to an agreed ontology convention.
Collaborations. This specifies any other components it requires to collaborate with to solve the problem utilizing the same ontology for the component identifier (as per section 2.2, the design goal is to keep collaborations to a minimum). Furthermore, it is to include interface specifications for those collaborations.
• Constraints and Limitations. The constraints and limitations are expressed in terms of design metrics for each element, including those related to safety, quality attributes, pre and post conditions, and invariants.
• Controls. The controls for the software component should describe the failure conditions, safety features, protection mechanisms, and any potential safety concerns as well as the mitigation strategy. The controls are the means for preventing failure and for mitigating the hazard causal factors.
• 
Safety Analysis
A component that has been designed for reuse, meeting the attributes of reusable software components, and is specified appropriately does not automatically make it suitable for application in a safety-critical system-ofsystems. Safety-critical system-of-systems are so complex that each software component must be assessed for suitability in the environment through a hazard analysis or in this specific case, a system-of-systems hazard analysis. This is further reinforced in the FAA's air circular guidance (AC20-148) on reusable software components (RSC) where for acceptance as an RSC and each subsequent reuse requires that there be no safety (and other) concerns before approval (although it is not specified how this will be done). Having quality software components that are wellspecified does not guarantee safe operation in an environment and state space that is significantly large and contains additional hazards to those represented by the sum of all concomitant system hazards in the system-ofsystems. These additional hazards are called emergent hazards and need to be identified, analyzed, and treated along with revisiting and analyzing those existing system hazards. A system-of-systems hazard analysis is essential before an effective reuse decision is made on a software component for use in safety-critical system-of-systems. This is required once a specification match is achieved. When a software component is considered for reuse in this environment, the system-of-systems hazard analysis must be updated to include the analysis of the system hazards as well as any potential emergent hazards that could arise through the use of the system containing the reused software component.
The system safety process [7] and the risk management process [8] are very similar, both starting with the identification of their respective elements followed by analysis and a way of treating those elements. It is the identification part of the process which is the most difficult as it is not easy or even technically feasible to identify all risks, hazards or potential risks and hazards. If the risks or hazards are not identified then there is nothing that can intentionally be done to treat them. Furthermore, it is often the identification part of the system that is the entry point for risks or hazards and if missed here they will not be considered. This is further exacerbated in a system-ofsystems context as there are emergent hazards that cannot be attributed to any one system in isolation. Any technique that just sums those system hazards within the safetycritical system-of-systems will omit this important and significant category of hazards. Ways to overcome the identification problem are to:
• Use a well developed ontology of hazards or hazard categories and apply a hazard analysis process to each category. This will serve as a way to identify the high-level abstract hazards that could possibly exist and allow for exploration in more detail in each category, through hazard decomposition, considering the impact of the addition of the new component.
• Brainstorming or utilizing the collaboration of all stakeholders as a potential source of hazard information and empower them to identify hazards in their own area for consideration by the system safety team.
• Utilize safety experts. This is required in most system safety efforts. System safety experts or team members are essential members of the development and operational team through the input of safety information into the process; however, they do not provide a systematic way of identifying all hazards. Furthermore, they do not necessarily have expertise in areas where hazards may exist. They are not the panacea to the identification problem but serve as an essential member and part of the solution.
It is the hazard identification problem which is the most important as once identified they can be considered, tracked, and the appropriate treatment provided in the right form at the right time.
When a software component or artifact is to be reused the system-of-system hazard analysis needs to be revisited and updated to include the new component and its system as well as revisiting the emergent hazards analysis and considering the emergent hazard categories for potential new hazards.
A potential process for a system-of-systems hazard analysis that incorporates software reuse is:
1. Establish the context or environment for the systemof-systems 2. Identify all systems in the system-of-systems 3. Conduct the system safety process as defined in MIL-STD-882D or similar standard such as AS/NZS 4360 to identify, analyze, evaluate and treat all system hazards including those of the system(s) containing the reused software.
4. Define the system-of-systems architecture 5. Identify the emergent hazards of the system-ofsystems using a suitable technique based upon an ontology of hazards (such as those partially identified by Redmond [9] to include reconfiguration, integration, and interoperability hazards at a high level of abstraction) to assist in considering all the potential hazard types and their specifics based on the system-of-systems architecture. It is essential to utilize stakeholder collaboration and safety experts as part of this process. The process involves continual feedback, review, monitoring, communication and consultation of hazard and risk information and continues until the mishap risk reaches an acceptable value determined by the appropriate governing body of the system-of-systems (e.g., for civil aviation in the USA that body would be the FAA and for military aviation in Australia, the Australian Defence Force (ADF)). Furthermore, the process is not purely sequential.
Step 3, the system safety process, should be performed in parallel with steps 4, 5, and 6 with collaboration and communication between them to ensure that relevant hazard information is shared.
Software Safety Metrics
An important part of the information on any software component and program activity is the relevant metrics. In this section those metrics of interest when developing software for reuse in safety-critical system-ofsystems are ranked in Table 1 along with expected values and the part of the software life cycle they are relevant for. As explained in the C 5 RA specification model, these metrics should be made available to enable future reuse (as well as evolution) and should be specified within the Constraints and Limitations element of the model. 
Application of the Framework
For the purpose of discussing how this framework may be applied, a generic piece of avionics software is chosen as the reusable software component and the safety-critical system-of-systems is a US Naval aviation system-ofsystems. It is assumed that there is a desire among stakeholders to reuse this avionics software in future aircraft systems or additional platforms within a system-ofsystems (as evident in the Navy's open architecture strategy which among other things seeks to enable component reuse). The system-of-systems includes the aircraft, air traffic control, communication systems, naval vessels and bases, and the ground-and air-based systems of all those elements interoperating with naval aviation to achieve the common mission. (For simplicity, we ignored sea-and space-based systems.)
This holistic, systematic framework is applied throughout the software life cycle of the reusable software component. When developing this avionics software component and determining its acceptability for reuse in the environment the following approach should be applied:
• Ensure that the organizational factors are supportive of reuse and that adopting a reuse approach will not be undermined by incongruent organizational factors. Create the appropriate organizational structure to manage the software component and a reuse repository staffed with the appropriate people to manage it. Invest the necessary resources in the reuse effort to ensure that the software component is suitable for reuse with significant stakeholder support for the decision to design for reuse. Align organizational policies so that they incentivize reuse and that ensure it is managed effectively.
• Design for reuse through the appropriate investments in quality, ensuring the software component exhibits the requisite attributes described in section 2.2. Apply the software safety metrics described in section 2.5 to assess progress in designing in safety in their respective order of significance at the applicable stages throughout development, with the aim here of minimizing the mishap risk. These software safety metrics are applied to ensure that safety is considered throughout the development process.
• Document the software component using the specification guidelines of the framework. Ensure that all knowledge of that component remains with the component using the C 5 RA software component specification model, utilizing an appropriate stakeholder (or regulator) endorsed ontology and the respective software artifacts for the software component. The specification of the component must facilitate searching by a respective future user (specification matching); that is, a potential user must be able to decide whether the component meets the requirement and provide more detailed information once a decision has been made to investigate the component further. The C 5 RA model should be used as a high-level abstract description of the component, coupled with an appropriate stakeholder-endorsed ontology to assist in providing the information required by future potential users and maintainers of the software as it evolves. All software artifacts for the component should be properly documented in the respective accepted languages and models and provided with the C 5 RA model information. The component should be placed in the reuse repository where that information can be accessed, supported by tools, and managed in accordance with policy.
• Perform a system-of-systems hazard analysis which incorporates the reusable software component. This systemof-systems hazard analysis will include the identification, analysis, and treatment of all system-of-system hazards (system hazards and emergent hazards). This analysis information or component knowledge is to be treated as additional documentation and included with the component. Evidence must be obtained and captured that is supportive of an acceptable level of safety risk (i.e., that the safetycritical system-of-systems to contain the component is "safe enough").
• Provide required information or component knowledge to the certification authority regardless of whether this information has been provided to the applicant, integrator or user in order to achieve certification for operation in the system-of-systems.
• Capture reuse metrics throughout the software life cycle and update the reuse cost benefit analysis in order to measure the success of the reuse program. This will ensure that reuse performance is measured to enable leveraged success and to populate and update institutional memory.
Conclusions
We presented a process-neutral framework for software reuse in safety-critical system-of-systems. More work is needed to refine the C 5 RA specification model with a fully developed ontology to incorporate more precision to the specification and a better-shared understanding. In addition, we need to conduct more case studies to determine the effectiveness of the framework and to refine the ranking of the software safety metrics.
